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Traditionally, frequency dependent evolutionary dynamics is described by deterministic replicator dynamics
assuming implicitly infinite population sizes. Only recently have stochastic processes been introduced to study
evolutionary dynamics in finite populations. However, the relationship between deterministic and stochastic
approaches remained unclear. Here we solve this problem by explicitly considering large populations. In par-
ticular, we identify different microscopic stochastic processes that lead to the standard or the adjusted replicator
dynamics. Moreover, differences on the individual level can lead to qualitatively different dynamics in asym-
metric conflicts and, depending on the population size, can even invert the direction of the evolutionary process.
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Darwinian evolution represents an intrinsically frequency
dependent process. The fitness or reproductive output of an
individual is not only linked to environmental conditions but
also tightly coupled to the type and frequency of its com-
petitors. Evolutionary game theory [1, 2, 3, 4] has become
a powerful framework to investigate the evolutionary fate of
individual traits with differing competing abilities. Consider
a population of two types A and B. The fitness (or payoff)
of the two types depends on their interaction partners and is
determined by the payoff matrix
A B
A a b
B c d
. (1)
Traditionally, the dynamics of such systems is investigated in
the context of the well-known replicator equation [2, 3, 4],
a deterministic differential equation describing the change in
frequency of the two (or more) types in infinite populations.
For two types, this results in four basic scenarios of coevo-
lutionary dynamics [5], while complex dynamics can arise in
higher dimensions [6].
In nature, however, populations are finite in size and the
deterministic selection process is augmented and disturbed by
stochastic effects and random drift. This has long been recog-
nized by population geneticists and goes back to the seminal
work by Wright [7] and Fisher [8]. Assuming a finite but con-
stant population size the balance between selection and drift
can be described by the Moran process [9]. The microscopic
dynamics consists of three simple steps: (i) selection, an indi-
vidual is randomly selected for reproduction with a probabil-
ity proportional to its fitness; (ii) reproduction, the selected in-
dividual produces one (identical) offspring; (iii) replacement,
the offspring replaces a randomly selected individual in the
population.
The Moran process allows to derive the fixation probability
of mutant genes or investigate the effect of population struc-
tures on the fixation probability [10]. Originally, the Moran
process was formulated in a frequency independent setting
where the fitness of an individual is genetically determined
and remains unaffected by interactions with other individuals
as in Ref. [11]. Only recently, the frequency dependent ap-
proach of evolutionary game theory and the Moran process
have been successfully combined in order to investigate the
evolutionary dynamics in finite populations [12, 13]. The fit-
ness of an individual now comprises two components: the fre-
quency independent baseline fitness which is associated with
genetic predisposition and the frequency dependent contribu-
tion from interactions with other members of the population.
Thus, evolutionary dynamics can be described by a continu-
ous deterministic replicator equation or by a stochastic micro-
scopic description of a birth-death process such as the Moran
process. So far, the relation and transition between the two ap-
proaches remained unclear. We show that different replicator
dynamics are associated with different microscopic processes
and moreover that the dynamics derived for infinite popula-
tions may undergo qualitative changes in finite populations.
If every individual interacts with a representative sample
of the population, the average payoff of A and B individuals
will be determined by the fraction of coplayers of both types.
Excluding self interactions, this leads to the payoffs
piAi =
a (i− 1) + b(N − i)
N − 1
(2)
piBi =
c i+ d(N − i− 1)
N − 1
,
where i is the number ofA individuals andN is the population
size.
The effective reproductive fitness of an individual of type
k is then given by 1 − w + wpiki where w determines the
relative contributions of the baseline fitness, which is conve-
niently normalized to one, and the payoffs result from interac-
tions with other individuals [12]. Thus, w corresponds to the
strength of selection acting on the game under consideration.
Note that any w < 1 can be mapped to a system with a differ-
ent payoff matrix and w = 1 [14]. For the Moran process, the
probability that the number of A individuals increases from i
to i+ 1 is
T+(i) =
1− w + w piAi
1− w + w 〈pii〉
i
N
N − i
N
, (3)
2whereas it decreases from i to i− 1 with probability
T−(i) =
1− w + w piBi
1− w + w 〈pii〉
i
N
N − i
N
. (4)
〈pii〉 =
(
piAi i+ pi
B
i (N − i)
)
/N is the average payoff in the
population.
Note that the selection mechanism in the Moran process re-
quires perfect global information on the current state of the
population. This is a very strong requirement and in many
situations undesirable. Therefore, we propose an alternative
formulation for the microscopic processes entirely based on
local information: In each time step, a randomly chosen indi-
vidual b compares its payoff to the payoff of another randomly
chosen individual a. It switches to the other’s strategy with
probability
p =
1
2
+
w
2
pia − pib
∆pimax
, (5)
where ∆pimax is the maximum possible payoff difference and
0 < w ≤ 1 measures the strength of selection. Note that in
contrast to the Moran process, the local update is invariant un-
der linear rescaling of the payoff matrix. The transition matrix
for the number of A individuals in this process i is then given
by
T+(i) =
(
1
2
+
w
2
piAi − pi
B
i
∆pimax
)
i
N
N − i
N
T−(i) =
(
1
2
+
w
2
piBi − pi
A
i
∆pimax
)
i
N
N − i
N
. (6)
In both process, the number of A individuals remains constant
with probability T 0(i) = 1 − T+(i) − T−(i). Further, the
states i = 0 and i = N are absorbing.
We can directly compute the probability that a single A in-
dividual fixates in the population, φA. In general, this proba-
bility is given by [15]
φA =
1
1 +
∑N−1
k=1
∏k
i=1
T−(i)
T+(i)
. (7)
In the limit of weak selection, w ≪ 1, the fixation probabili-
ties can be computed analytically [16]. The fixation probabil-
ity for the Moran process is higher than for the local update
mechanism if ∆pimax > 2.
The stochastic process can be formulated in terms of the
master equation [17, 18]
P τ+1(i)− P τ (i) = P τ (i− 1)T+(i − 1)− P τ (i)T−(i)
+P τ (i+ 1)T−(i + 1)− P τ (i)T+(i)
where P τ (i) is the probability that the system is in state i at
time τ . Introducing the notation x = i/N , t = τ/N and the
probability density ρ(x, t) = N P τ (i) yields
ρ
(
x, t+N−1
)
− ρ (x, t) = ρ
(
x−N−1, t
)
T+(x−N−1)
+ρ
(
x+N−1, t
)
T−(x+N−1)
−ρ (x, t) T−(x)− ρ (x, t)T+(x).
For N ≫ 1, the probability densities and the transition proba-
bilities are expanded in a Taylor series at x and t. Neglecting
higher order terms in N−1 we get [17]
d
dt
ρ(x, t) = −
d
dx
[a(x)ρ(x, t)] +
1
2
d2
dx2
[
b2(x)ρ(x, t)
]
, (8)
with a(x)=T+(x)−T−(x) and b(x)=
√
1
N [T
+(x) + T−(x)].
Note that, for large but finiteN , this equation has the form of a
Fokker-Planck equation. Since the internal noise is not corre-
lated in time as subsequent update steps are independent, the
Itoˆ calculus [17] can be applied to derive a Langevin equation
x˙ = a(x) + b(x)ξ, (9)
where ξ is uncorrelated Gaussian noise and b(x) = 0 for
x = 0 and x = 1. The multiplicative noise term leaves the
absorbing nature of the boundaries unaffected. Qualitatively
similar results are obtained by introducing noise in the payoff
matrix [19, 20]. In contrast, to account for stochastic effects
through additive noise [21, 22] is problematic because of the
boundaries of x.
ForN →∞, the diffusion term b(x) vanishes with 1√
N
and
a deterministic equation is obtained. For the Moran process,
this yields
x˙ = lim
N→∞
(
piAi − pi
B
i
Γ + 〈pii〉
i
N
N − i
N
)
(10)
= x
(
piA(x)− 〈pi(x)〉
) 1
Γ + 〈pi(x)〉
,
where piA(x) = xa+(1− x)b, piB(x) = x c+(1− x)d, and
〈pi(x)〉 = xpiA(x) + (1 − x)piB(x). Γ = 1−ww is essentially
the baseline fitness. Equation (10) is the adjusted replicator
dynamics introduced in Ref. [3]; an alternative derivation for
imitation dynamics is given in [23].
For the local update mechanism, we find
x˙ = lim
N→∞
(
w
piAi − pi
B
i
∆pimax
i
N
N − i
N
)
= κx
(
piA(x)− 〈pi(x)〉
)
, (11)
where κ = w∆pimax is a constant factor influencing the
timescale only. Equation (11) is the standard replicator equa-
tion and represents the traditional approach to evolutionary
dynamics in infinite populations [4]. The difference between
the two dynamics amounts to a dynamic rescaling of time
which leaves the fixed points unchanged. Nevertheless, the
differences in the microscopic updating can give rise to sub-
stantial differences in the macroscopic dynamics. To illus-
trate this, let us consider two famous examples: the Prisoner’s
Dilemma [24] and Dawkins Battle of the Sexes [25].
The Prisoner’s Dilemma describes the problem of coopera-
tion where two players simultaneously decide whether to co-
operate (C) or defect (D). Cooperation incurs costs c but pro-
duces a benefit b to the other player (b > c) whereas defection
3neither costs nor benefits anyone. In this game defection is
dominant because defectors are better off no matter what the
other player does. Thus, rational players end up with nothing
rather than earning the more favorable payoff for mutual co-
operation — hence the dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is
determined by the payoff matrix
D C
D c b+ c
C 0 b
(12)
where we added c in order to avoid negative payoffs. Figure
1 compares the evolution from a state with a small fraction of
defectors into the evolutionary end state with defectors only.
The standard replicator dynamics for the Prisoner’s Dilemma
is given by x˙ = w cb+c x(1 − x), where x is the fraction of
defectors. The solution yields
x(t) = x0
[
x0 + (1 − x0)e
−wtc/(b+c)
]−1
, (13)
with x(0) = x0 and x(t→∞) = x∗ = 1. The adjusted repli-
cator dynamics can be solved only numerically for the given
payoff matrix and generalw. For w > 0, Fig. 1 illustrates that
the convergence to x∗ = 1 is faster for the adjusted replicator
dynamics as compared to the standard replicator dynamics.
Dawkins Battle of the Sexes [25, 26] is a cyclic game refer-
ring to asymmetric conflicts in parental care: If males (|) are
philanderers (B|), it pays for females (~) to be coy (A~), in-
sisting on a long courtship period to make males invest more
in the offspring. However, once most males are faithful (A|),
fast females are favored (B~) avoiding the costs of courtship.
Subsequently, the male investment into the offspring is no
longer justified, philanderers are again favored (B|), and the
cycle continues. This is characterized by the payoff matrix
A~ B~
A| (+1,−1) (−1,+1)
B| (−1,+1) (+1,−1)
(14)
where the first element is the payoff of the males and the sec-
ond element is the payoff of the females [3]. Note that this
game is also called ’Matching Pennies’ [22, 28].
The dynamics of Dawkins Battle of the Sexes is qualita-
tively different for the adjusted and the standard replicator dy-
namics [3]. Comparisons of the deterministic dynamics to the
corresponding stochastic process in finite populations reveal
further interesting differences. For the standard replicator dy-
namics H = −x(1 − x)y(1 − y), where x is the fraction of
faithful males and y the fraction of coy females, is a constant
of motion which measures the distance from the Nash equilib-
rium q = (12 ,
1
2 ). Consequently, q is a neutrally stable fixed
point surrounded by periodic orbits. Figure 2 shows that this is
a spurious result valid only in the limitN = N~ = N| →∞.
For any finite N , H˙ > 0 holds and every trajectory spirals
away from q. Note that in this case H˙ is approximated by
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FIG. 1: Prisoners Dilemma: (a) Approach to the Nash equilibrium
from an initial state with 10% defectors for simulations of the Moran
process (◦) and the local update rule (N) with N = 200 as com-
pared to numerical solutions of the corresponding adjusted replicator
dynamics (dashed line) and the standard replicator dynamics (solid
line), respectively. The dynamics based on the Moran process con-
verges much faster to the equilibrium state x∗ = 1. (b), (c) Con-
vergence of the stochastic simulations (◦,N) and the corresponding
Langevin equations (dashed and solid lines) to the deterministic ad-
justed and standard replicator dynamics for increasing population
sizes N . (b) Deviations of the mean fraction of defectors at time
t1 (depicted in (a) by the arrows) where the corresponding (adjusted)
replicator dynamics predicts x(t1) = 0.5; (c) same for the variance
of the mean fraction of defectors. The results for the simulations and
the Langevin equation are in excellent agreement. Both the devia-
tions and the variance converge to the deterministic dynamics with
1/N (dotted line), as expected (b = 1, c = 0.5, w = 0.9, time scale
for simulations 1/N , averages over 106 realizations).
〈∆H〉 = 〈H(t + 1) − H(t)〉, which is calculated for a sin-
gle stochastic update step and averaged over many realiza-
tions. In contrast, the adjusted replicator dynamics leads to
H˙ ≤ 0, where equality holds only at the Nash equilibrium q.
H represents a Lyapunov function with q as the unique and
asymptotically stable interior fixed point. Interestingly, for fi-
nite N , i.e. for the Moran process, the drift towards q changes
sign: Below a critical population size Nc(w), q is unstable
and the trajectories spiral towards the boundary. However, for
N > Nc(w), q becomes stable, cf. Fig. 2. Similar qualitative
changes based on population sizes have recently been reported
in Refs. [13, 29].
In conclusion, we presented a mathematically consistent
transition from descriptions of the microscopic processes rel-
evant for individual based simulations over stochastic approx-
imations of the dynamics in finite populations to a determinis-
tic mean field theory governed by replicator dynamics. In par-
ticular, we have shown that the intrinsic stochasticity arising
in finite populations can be captured by a Langevin term in the
replicator dynamics. This leads naturally to absorbing bound-
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FIG. 2: Battle of the sexes: (a) Average drift in a finite population
for different population size N and fixed w = 0.3 for the local up-
date mechanism (N) and the Moran process (◦). For 〈∆H〉 < 0,
the system spirals to the Nash equilibrium q; for 〈∆H〉 > 0, it spi-
rals towards the absorbing boundaries. For the local update process,
∆H → 0 with 1/N (see inset), which hints at the constant of mo-
tion in the limit N → ∞ (see text). For the Moran process, the
system drifts towards the boundaries below a critical population size
Nc (marked by the arrow) but approaches q for N > Nc. (b) The
critical population size Nc (where 〈∆H〉 ≈ 0) decreases as a func-
tion of the selection pressure w (N = N~ = N|, averages over 107
realizations).
aries in the resulting stochastic differential equation. Both,
the microscopic processes and their stochastic approximation
converge with 1/N to the solution of the corresponding repli-
cator equation.
The frequency dependent Moran process [12] is intimately
connected to the adjusted replicator dynamics [3]. Conversely,
the proposed local update rule corresponds to a finite popula-
tion equivalent of the standard replicator dynamics [4]. While
the qualitative dynamics of the two approaches is the same,
quantitative differences vanish only upon non-linear rescal-
ing of time. However, for interacting (sub)populations, such
rescaling is no longer possible and can give rise to entirely dif-
ferent qualitative dynamics. In particular, for Dawkins Battle
of the Sexes, we have shown that, for the Moran process, the
stability of the mixed Nash equilibrium depends on the popu-
lation size such that it becomes unstable below a critical size
and no mixed population can persist.
John Maynard Smith asked whether the adjusted or the
standard replicator dynamics is more appropriate to describe
evolutionary changes [3]. Here we have shown that this is
fully determined by the underlying microscopic processes.
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